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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
' STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
i ·V· 
ROY J. TIPPETTS , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15512 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Roy J. Tippetts, appeals from a conviction 
I of Robbery, a Felony of the Second Degree, in the Fourth Judicial 
f~istrict, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. 
Robert Bullock, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Roy J. Tippetts, was charged with Robbery 
i :n violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1953 as amended). On the 
11 
; ·th day of October, 1977, the appellant was found guilty of the offense 
1 as charged by a jury. Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to 
\ lncarceration at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 
I ine to fifteen years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of this conviction and a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of trial, counsel for the co-defendant was 
taken ill and unable to attend trial. This development was brought to 
the attention of the trial court in the judge's chambers by the 
appellant's attorney, Mr. Michael Esplin, before the jury was impanele 
(R. 1). At that time a conversation was held between His Honor, Mr. 
Esplin, and the co-defendant to determine whether the co-defendant 
should be granted a continuance, or whether he would be willing to 
go to trial that day represented by Mr. Esplin (R. 2). The court 
explained to Mr. Lopez that a conflict of interest might exist betweer 
himself and the appellant. However, the court did not advise Mr. 
Lopez that he had a right to separate representation, nor did he 
seek to ascertain whether Mr. Lopez understood the details of Mr. 
Esplin' s possible conflict of interest and the potential perils of sue 
a conflict (R. 2). Instead, the court merely inquired of Mr. Lopez 
whether he desired a continuance in the matter or whether he preferrec 
to proceed to trial that day with Mr. Esplin representing him (R. Z). 
Mr. Lopez indicated his concern over not languishing in jail any longer 
while awaiting a new trial date (R. 2) and assented to going to trial 
that day with appellant's counsel as his own counsel (R. 4). 
f going At no time was the appellant present during the ore · 
el! ;nl Warn the app -· conversation and at no time did the court personally 
- 2 - J 
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of the potential dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict 
, 0f interest. Nor did the court ever procure a voluntary waiver of 
I 
appellant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
With Mr. Esplin as counsel for both Mr. Lopez and Mr. 
~.Tippetts, the trial commenced as scheduled. The testimony showed that 
Ion August 30, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m. the Riverbend Lounge 
I (located at the mouth of Provo Canyon) was robbed by two men. Lori 
Elliot, a part-time waitress at the Riverbend, identified the two men 
who robbed the lounge as the appellant, Roy Tippetts, and his co-
l 
defendant, Henry Lopez (R. 13-14). Three other witnesses testified 
\that they were customers at the Riverbend on the morning that it was 
I I robbed (R. 27, 33, 38). All three witnesses identified the appellant 
lmd his co-defendant as the perpetrators of the robbery (R. 28, 35, 40, 
\l). 
Trooper John Moon testified that he apprehended the 
appellant, the co-defendant and two other individuals in an automobile 
1ear the top of Provo Canyon shortly after he received a radio 
communication that a robbery had been perpetrated at the Riverbend 
~~ge in Provo Canyon (R. 43-46). The trooper testified that two 
other individuals in the car with the appellant and co-defendant 
identified themselves as the brothers of Mr. Lopez (R. 52). Some 
~oney was located in the automobile (R. 51), however no weapon was 
located in the automobile nor was any found at the scene where the 
car was stopped (R. 52). 
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defense rested 
·:ithout calling any witnesses (R. 59). Based upon the foregoing the 
- 3 -
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jury found both the appellant and the co-defendant guilty of robbery. · 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
A. AN ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN DUAL 
REPRESENTATION RENDERS HIS REPRESENTATION INEFFECTIVE. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee an accused' 
the right to counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 72 U.S. 335 I I 
(1963). It is well settled that one lawyer may represent more than I 
one defendant so long as his representation is effective. Powell v. I 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, effective assistance of counseil 
contemplates that such assistance be "untrammeled and unimpaired 
by . . . requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent 
conflicting interests." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 
(1942). 1 
The danger implicit in dual representation is that an 
attorney who undertakes such a task finds himself similtaneously 
balancing the interests of each defendant against the other. The 
I 
1. The A. B .A. Code of Professional Responsibility precludes ~ la~er [' 
from representing one client if the interests of another may impat~ ~i 
his independent judgment. Such representation is countenanced on.ble 
after full disclosure is made to the involved parties of the P0551 1 
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent 
judgment on behalf of each of them. [D.R. 5-105(c)]. 
- 4 -
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1 .. problem is aggravated by the fact that an attorney can rarely predict 
1 
:ihen a conflict of interest will or will not arise. There are too 
~any unknown variables in a criminal trial for an attorney to presume 
to know whether the interests of one client will conflict with another. 
1 one commentator has elaborated on this imbroglio which stalemates 
I an attorney who seeks to undertake dual representation: 
1ed1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,eil 
I 
The interests and defenses of co-defendants are, 
as a general rule, antagonistic; and, given the fact 
of joint representation, a strong likelihood arises 
that a conflict exists or will ensue. The inherent 
difficulty in such a situation is that a single 
attorney must simultaneously steer the defenses of 
each defendant on proper course thereby wasting much 
of his valuable courtroom concentration on the task 
of preventing scrapes and collisions between multi-
client interests. He can no longer freely decide 
what will be most advantageous for the defense of 
one client without first weighing against it the dis-
advantages that might consequently accrue to the 
other. He must, in short, temper his strategy to a 
middle-of-the-road position. This condition, of 
course, imposes an artificial and strained approach 
on a singular counsel which prevents him from 
developing a full, aggressive defensive strategy. 
The shattering impact of skilled technique which 
ordinarily could be leveled in full force against 
the opposition must be partially, and often substantially, 
diffused in a constant concern to calculate the 
possible harm each maneuver might work on the co-
defendant. Counsel must pick, choose, compromise 
and forego various attacks because of the threat of 
adverse repercussions to the interests of the co-
defendant. He is thereby prevented from the use of 
all the weapons in his legal armory. Note, 23 Ark. 
L. Rev. 250, 254. 
Because of the unforseeability of conflicts of interest, 
'
1 l~he A.B.A. has advised that dual representation be undertaken only 
1. 
e I 
tnthemost extraordinary of situations. The A.B.A. "Standards Relating 
'.o the Administration of Criminal Justice - The Defense Function" 
i 
i'JS(b) (1971), warns that: 
- 5 -
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Sixth Amendment representation is lacking if 
unknown to the accused and without his knowledge-
able assent, his lawyer is in a duplicitous position 
where his full talents as a vigorous lawyer having 
the single aim of acquittal of all means fair and 
honorable are hobbled 2r fettered or restrained by 
commitments to others. 
The seminal case in the area of dual representation and 
ineffective assistance of counsel is Glasser v. United States, supra. 
In Glasser v. United States, supra, the government tried five co-
defendants for conspiracy to defraud the government. Two of the 
five co-defendants, Kretske and Glasser, were initially represented 
by separate counsel. However, at trial Kretske became dissatisfied 
with his appointed counsel. The trial court then ordered Stewart, 
the attorney retained by Glasser, to represent Kretske. The Court 
I 
agreed with Glasser that his right to effective assistance of counsel 
1 had been abridged by the dual representation. The Court stated that 
Stewart's "struggle to serve two masters" did impair his effectivenes;I < 
Although the Court did point to the attorney's failure to cross- I i 
examine a key witness and his failure to make certain evidentiary I 1 
i 
objections as evidence of his dual loyalties, the Court refused to It 
require any precise degree of prejudice be shown. The Court observec 1 d 
To determine the precise degree of prejudice I 
sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's 
appointment . . . is at once difficult and un- I 0 
necessary. The right to have the assistance of 1 5 counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow 
courts to indul~e in nice calculations as to the I r 
amount of preju ice arising from its denial. 315 I 
U.S. at 75-76. (Emphasis Supplied) r 
I 
. b . 1 . t s tatei . r] 2. Similarly, the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsi. 1. l Yh le!':I · 
that it is the "duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to t e a: 
system, to represent his client zealously. " 
- 6 -
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Later in the opinion, the Court came its closest to 
enunciating a standard when it stated that where it appeared from 
~he record that Stewart's representation of Glasser 
m~t have been more effective had there been no dual representation, 
I a new trial was necessary. 315 U.S. at 76. Thus, the thrust of Glasser v. United 
I States, supra, would appear to be that actual prejudice need not be ,_
I 
shown when an actual conflict develops which inhibits an attorney's 
I 
I ability to maneuver. 
I Since Glasser v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court has 
only recently., re-examined the issue of 
I I counsel due to conflicts of interest. 
ineffective assistance of 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 
I 
I u. s. (1978), 23 Cr. L. 3001, three co-defendants were jointly 
I 
represented by a court appointed lawyer. Both before trial and later 
at trial, the co-defendants requested separate counsel based on their 
1/ appointed attorney's representations that because of confidential 
I information received from the co-defendants, he felt he was con-
1 fronted with representing conflicting interests. On both occasions, 
I 
I the trial court refused to appoint separate counsel and the co-
1! defendants were ultimately convicted. 
I The Supreme Court had little difficulty condemning the actions I of the trial court. The Court held that the failure to either appoint 
I separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the 
I . k 
I
ns was too remote to warrant separate counsel, in the face of the 
representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again before 
I 
the jury was empanelled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of 
assistance of counsel. In reaching this result, the Court ruled that 
- 7 -
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an aggrieved defendant had no burden whatsoever to demonstrate 
prejudice. 
This holding was predicated on the Court's reading of 
Glasser v. United States, supra, as precluding "nice calculations as 
to the amount of prejudice" resulting from the denial of the fund-
amental right to effective assistance of counsel. Although the 
above quoted language from Glasser v. United States, supra, presupposei 
that an accused was prejudiced to some extent by joint representation, 
Mr. Justice Burger, writing for the Holloway court, pointed out that 
all the caselaw cited in Glasser v. United States, supra, as supportini 
that proposition actually presumes prejudice regardless of whether 
it was independently shown. 3 From this fact, Mr. Justice Burger conc:u 
that the harmless error rule has no application to right to counsel 
cases: 
Moreover, this court ha[s] concluded that the 
assistance of counsel is among those "constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction 
can never be treated as harmless error." 
23 Cr.L. at 3005. 
I 
3. The Hollowa+ court pointed out that the Supreme Court's refusal to: 
reverse Kretske s conviction in Glasser v. United States, supra, wa'. 
not contary to its interpretation of that case. Kretske did not raise 
any objection on appeal to his joint repesentation. 315 U.~. 60,_71 
Rather, some of the other co-defendants argued that Glasser s denial 
of effective assitance of counsel prejudiced them as alleged co- . 
conspirators. In that context, the Glasser court required a showing 
of prejudice. 
- 8 -
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rnreaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Burger explained that even 
1 if the Glasser opinion did not mandate automatic reversal, such a 
result was logically mandated if such grievances were to be redressed. 
This follows because the difficulty with applying the harmless 
1 error rule to conflict of interest cases is that discerning prejudice 
1 is not susceptible to intelligent and even-handed application. 
1 Elucidating this point, Mr. Justice Burger stated: 
I 
I 
In the normal case where a harmless error rule is 
applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope 
is readily identifiable . . . But in a case of joint 
representation of conflicting interests the evil -
it bears repeating - is in what the advocate finds 
himself compelled to refrain from doing ... Thus, 
an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would 
require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. 
23 Cr. L. at 3005. 
I Thus, the Holloway court concluded that because of the masked nature 
1 
of such an error, requiring a defendant to show any amount of prejudice 
would be too much. 
The appellant concedes that the per se reversal rule 
I announced · 1 · d h h in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, is on y triggere went e 
I attorney brings the potential or actual conflict of interest to the 
attention of the trial court. However, the appellant contends that 
although Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, does not require automatic 
reversal in the instant case, Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, does hold 
that even in the instant case, appellant need not show any quantum of 
prejudice. This is so because the rule announced in Holloway v. 
~ansas, supra, which presumes prejudice, regardless of whether it 
is shown independently, is not affected by whether the attorney does 
~ does not alert the trial court to the possibility or actuality of 
- 9 -
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the conflict of interest. Regardless of whether the attorney who 
has undertaken the responsibility of dual representation warns the 
trial court about conflict problems, the same "unguided speculation", 
I 
which persuaded the Holloway court to simply presume prejudice _ ex:I 
Certainly if the problem of "unguided speculation" precludes a re-
viewing court from applying the harmless error rule 
where the attorney has warned the trial court, then 
to the situation I 
that same problec
1 
logically inheres in the situation where the attorney fails to warn 
the trial court. 
In this regard, it is helpful to review what 
Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, did not decide. Significantly, 
the Holloway court specifically reserved ruling on how an attorney's I 
failure to advise the trial court of the potentiality or actuality of 
of a conflict impacts on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
In that situation, the Holloway court observed that two issues are 
cormnonly raised: 1) how strong a showing of conflict must be made 
and 2) what duty does the trial court have to alert defendants to 
the dangers implicity lurking in dual representation. 
I 
It seems clear that these are the issues that the Hollow~ 1 
I 
court viewed as uniquely affecting the situation in the instant case 1 
where the attorney neglects to advise the trial court of the conflic'. 
problem. However nothing in the language or the reasoning of the 
Holloway opinion would indicate that when the attorney fails to brini 
the conflict to the attention of the trial court that the aggrieved 
defendant then must shoulder the burden of showing how that conflict 
prejudiced his representation. On the contrary, the thrust of the 
- 10 -
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~loway decision makes clear that "a rule requiring a defendant to 
show a conflict of interests . . prejudiced him in some specific 
fashion would not be susceptible to intelligent, even-handed application." 
Thus, in the instant case this Court need not consider how 
the appellant was prejudiced by dual representation. Instead, we must 
hasten into the thicket avoided by the Holloway court and consider 
first, what duty does the trial court have to alert defendants to 
the dangers of dual representation, and second, how strong a showing 
of conflict must be made. In addition to these issues specifically 
noted by the Holloway court, two other issues are inextricably inter-
rnined in a dual representation case: who bears the burden of persuasion 
and what is the impact of an absence of waiver. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO 
ASCERTAIN THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT DEPRIVED OF THEIR 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY JOINT 
REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS. 
Although it is true that the right to effective assistance 
of counsel may be waived, a valid waiver requires an "intelligent 
relinguishment or abandonment of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). This standard was refined in Brady v. 
~ited States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), where the Court required that 
·valid waivers not only be voluntary, but also be "knowing, intelligent 
acts done with sufficinet awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences." This standard applies whenever a fundamental 
right is involved. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The protection 
afforded fundamental rights was made clear in Glasser v. United States, 
'l~pr~, where the Court stated that "we indulge every reasonable pre-
- 11 -
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sumption against the waiver of fundamental rights." 
In Glasser v. United States, supra, we also find the root 
of the trend towards placing an affirmative duty on the trial court 
to ascertain that the fact of joint representation is not merely a 
fortuitous occurrence, but rather, that it reflects a knowing and 
intelligent decision to forego the constitutional right to conflict· 
free, separate counsel. The Glasser court states: 
The trial court should protect the right of an 
accused to have the assistance of counsel. "This 
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver 
by the accused. While an accused may waive the 
right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver 
should be clearly determined by the trial court, 
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that 
determination to appear upon the recor~." 
(Citations omitted). 315 U.S. at 71. 
In Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir., 1% 
the court recognized that a fundamental right - the right to effect 
assistance of counsel - was unwittingly and routinely being waived 
by criminal defendants. In an attempt to prevent this sort of un· 
knowing forfeiture of Sixth Amendment rights.the court announced 
a rule requiring a trial judge to insure that co-defendants' decisio: 
to proceed with one attorney was an informed decision. The court 
explained the need for such an inquiry as follows: 
The judge's responsibility is not necessarily 
discharged by simply accepting the co-defendants' 
designation of a single attorney to represent them 
both. An individual defendant is rarely 
sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential 
conflicts, and when two defendants appear with a 
8) here tl 4. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (194 ! w lvemet 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the need for affirmative judicial invo 
in the waiver process. 
- 12 -
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single attorney it cannot be determined, absent 
inquiry by the trial judge, whether the attorney 
has made such an appraisal or has advised his 
clients o~ the risks. Considerations of 
efficient judicial administration as well as 
important rights of defendants are served when 
the trial judge makes the affirmative determination 
that co-defendants have intelligently chosen to 
be represented by the same attorney and that their 
decision was not governed by poverty and lack of 
information on the availablility of counsel. 
352 F.2d at 360. 
Numerous other courts have similarly recognized the propriety of 
allocating this duty to the trial court. 5 
C. THE ABSENCE OF A WAIVER SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO THE STATE ON THE QUESTION OF EITHER THE 
EXISTENCE OF A CONFLICT OR THE PREJUDICE RESULTING 
FROM A CONFLICT. 
The appellant submits that in the instant case where no on-
the-record waiver of his right to conflict-free, separate counsel 
appears (R. 1-4), the burden shifts to the State to prove either that 
no conflict existed, or that the conflict did not impair his represen-
tation at trial. The importance of the right to counsel has sparked 
icourts to formulate just such a prophylactic rule to insure its 
I 
protection. 
In United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir., 1974), 
a drug defendant challenged his conviction where his attorney had also 
represented his co-defendant. In rejecting this claim, the Court found 
that there was no divergence in the interests of the co-defendants. Although the 
l. See, United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, (1st Cir., 1974); ~n v. United States, 396 F.Zd 110, 114 (2d Cir., 1968~; United ~sex rel. Hart v. Daven~ort, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir., 1973); 
~d States v. Tru~lio, 49 F.2d 574 (4th Cir., 1974); and United 
~ v. Garcia 51 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir., 1975), which sets 
·;~t a Boykin-lik~ procedure for the waiver of the right to conflict-
, ee separate counsel. 
tnz - 13 -
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First Circuit held that dual representation had not adversely 
affected the defendant in that case, the Court went on to announci 
a rule that the lack of a satisfactory judicial inquiry into dual 
representation shifts the burden of proof on the question of prejui 
to the government. In such a situation, the government is requirea 
to demonstrate from the record the unlikelihood of prejudice by a 
preponderance of the evidence. In stating this rule, the Court 
specifically recognized the difficulties associated with an after-t 
fact reconstruction of prejudice. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently announced a 
simila+:" burden-shifting device to protect Sixth Amendment rights. 
State v. Olsen, 258 N.W. 2d 898 (Minn., 1977), the rule is stated 
this way: whenever a satisfactory inquiry does not appear on the 
record, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a prejudicial conflict of interest did not exi 
In justifying this rule, the Minnesota court explained that it has 
the benefit of protecting Sixth Amendment rights in such a way that 
it promotes effective judicial administration by providing an 
independent basis for appellate courts to easily assess the voluntar 
iness of the waiver of this right. To insure that defendants volun· 
tarily and knowingly opt for dual representation, the Minnesota co~ 
requires a comprehensive, Boykin-like inquiry by the trial court: 
The court should address each defendant personally 
and advise him of the potential danger of dual 
representation. The defendant should have an 
opportunity and be at liberty to question the 
trial court on the nature and consequences of 
dual representation and the entire procedure 
should be placed on the record for review. 
258 N.W. 2d at 907. 
- 14 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Significantly, the dissenting opinion in Holloway v. 
1rkansas, supra, also endorses the burden-shifting rules announced e--
.n United States v. Foster, supra, and State v. Olsen, supra, as 
1n alternative to the per se rule announced by the majority opinion. 
n his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Powell writes: 
I would follow the lead of the several Courts of 
Appeals that have recognized the trial court's 
duty of inquiry in joint representation cases 
without minimizing the constitutional predicate 
of "conflicting interests". 
n footnote 3, Mr. Justice Powell cites United States v. Carrigan, 
43 F.2d 1053 (2nd Cir., 1976), as illustrative of one of the "duty 
f inquiry" cases which he would endorse in lieu of the per se rule 
dopted by the majority opinion. In that case, two defendants were 
ointly represented by a single attorney. The record reflected 
hat the trial court made no inquiry into the possibility of a conflict 
f interest. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions 
fboth defendants. The Court held the trial court has an affirmative 
uty to inquire into the possiblity of a conflict of interest. When 
o such inquiry is made, the burden of proof on the question of prejudice 
1ifts to the government. 
The Eighth Circuit declined to adopt any burden-shifting 
rocedure in United States v. Lawriw, F. 2d , (8th Cir., 
l77), 22 Cr. L. 2369, although it does require the trial court to 
induct a Boykin-like inquiry into the decision of co-defendants to 
:cept dual representation. Without shifting the burden of persuasion 
1 the issue of prejudice, the Lawriw court effectively accomplishes 
ie same result. This is done by focusing 
ire attention on the validity of the waiver of a constitutional 
- 15 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
right. As the Court explains: 
While the potential for prejudice is not so inherent 
as to require a per se rule of conflict, it is none-
theless sufficiently persuasive that only a minimal 
showing of conflict should be required to invoke 
constitutional protection. Thus, in most cases the 
question will not be so much whether a conflict 
existed, but whether the defendant effectively 
waived it. 22 Cr. L. 2370. 
Accordingly, the Lawriw court warns: 
. . . that without such an inquiry a finding of 
knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom, if 
ever, be sustained by this Court ... Considering 
the minimal showing needed to establish the sub-
stantial possiblity of a conflict of interest, the 
importance of an adequate record to underpin a 
finding of waiver cannot be overstated. The 
administration of justice is best served by such 
an inquiry and we now require it. 
Thus, although it is the appellant's position that the 
issue of prejudice was foreclosed by Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, i 
it is an issue, then the State bears the burden of proof on that is> 
since the record clearly shows that the trial court made no inquiry 
whatsoever into the possibility of a conflict of interest. 
D. THE APPELLANT NEED ONLY SHOW THAT A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST EXISTED. 
Assuming arguendo that the absence of a waiver is not 
dispositive of the issue in the instant case, appellant submits that 
he need only show that the conflict of interest did exist. Appellan' 
submits that the unique feature of conflict of interest cases is that 
it is extremely difficult to point to tangible evidence of the con-
flict. sen· This is so because the attorney who undertakes dual repre 
tation may strive to reconcile the conflict. 
. . n The majority op1n10 
b l 11re: in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, recognized this peculiar pro em· 
- 16 -
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I 
I 
it stated: 
But in a case of joint representation of conflicting 
interests the evil - it bears repeating - is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain 
from doing .. (Emphasis in original) 23 Cr. L. 
at 3005. 
In Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir., 1973), the 
Court warned that the appearance of having consciously chosen one 
defense over another may be mis leading, and often belies the efforts 
of an attorney "to reconcile conflicting interests rather than to 
enforce, to their full extent, the rights of the party whom he 
should alone represent. . . " 477 F. 2d at 625. 
The Court in Austin further noted: 
It must be remembered that in cases involving 
conflicts of interest, the conflict does not always 
appear full-blown upon the record since counsel may 
throughout endeavor to reconcile the conflict. 477 
F. 2d at 626. 
Accordingly, the Austin court, in granting a writ of habeas corpus, 
concluded that once an actual conflict of interest had been established 
the petitioner had met her burden. 
In People v. Gallardo, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969), the 
California Court applied the harmless error rule in reversing the 
convictions of two co-defendants represented by the same attorney. 
In that case, the Court only required a potential conflict of interest 
to trigger a reversal. The facts in Gallardo bear a marked resemblance 
to the facts in the case at bar. In that case, both defendants informed 
'.he trial court on the day of trial that they felt a conflict of interest 
nrecluded their court appointed attorney from effectively representing 
!Oth of their interests at trial. The court appointed attorney 
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informed the court that he did not feel there was any conflict. 
The trial court denied the defendants' requests for separate co~s 
At the trial which innnediately followed, the defendants presented 
no evidence. 
Noting that the record may be silent as to the existence 
of a conflict, the Gallardo court held that a potential conflict 
suffices: 
Separate counsel for each defendant, throughout 
the proceedings might have employed tactics for 
the best interest of his defendant, including a 
vigorous assault on the remaining defendant, with-
out having to consider the interest of such other 
defendant. Where, on the other hand, counsel 
represents both defendants, he must ... "make 
connnon cause" for both clients. If he does not 
he runs the risk of throwing one client to the 
wolves, to benefit the other ... If he chooses 
the former course, the record is not likely to 
contain any positive evidence of an actual 
conflict. 74 Cal. Rptr. at 575-576. 
In the instant case, while there is no question as to the 
good faith of appellant's court appointed attorney, the fact of the 
matter is that just as in People v. Gallardo, supra, he was mistakeni 
his belief that there was no conflict. 
The affidavits of the appellant and Sandra Gibson attache 
hereto as Appendix A and B, leave no doubt that the appellant and 
the co-defendant had antagonistic defenses. In the case at bar, 
d I just as in People v. Gallardo, supra, no evidence was presente · 
we view this decision not to put on a defense as the "tip of the 
iceberg", it is readily apparent that counsel for appellant adopted 
this middle-of-the-road strategy to appease the conflicting interest 
of his two clients. 
The Third Circuit also only requires a showing of a 
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possible conflict of interest to sustain an ineffective assistance 
.of counsel claim. The Third Circuit explained its view of the legal 
standard to be applied in conflict of interest cases in Hart v. 
~enport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir., 1973): 
On the other hand, we have rejected the approach 
that before relief will be considered the defendant 
must show some specific instance of prejudice 
[Citations omitted] Instead, we have held that upon 
a showing of a possible conflict of interest or 
prejudice, however remote, we will re~ard joint 
re resentation as c nstitutionall de ective. 
Emphasis Supp ied 
In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir., 1966), Sawyer 
denied his guilt while his co-defendant admitted in a confession 
his own complicity, accused Sawyer of participation in the robbery, 
and endeavored to pass most of the blame onto Sawyer. In granting 
Sawyer's writ of habeas corpus, the Fourth Circuit agreed with 
him that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where 
his court appointed attorney also represented his co-defendant. 
A closer examination of the facts in Sawyer reveals a 
startling similarity to the facts in the case at bar. In Sawyer, 
the trial court viewed the confession as only implicating the co-
defendant, and accordinly, ruled that it was admissible against him 
alone. At Sawyer's habeas corpus hearing, his court appointed lawyer 
testified that he did not feel any conflict of interest existed 
Detween the co-defendants since he never viewed the co-defendant's 
statement as inculpating the defendant. Thus, the clear implication 
\. Also holding that a possible conflict of interest is sufficient 
'
0 sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Walker 
~ted States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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of the attorney's testimony was that his representation of Sawyer 
was not hampered by any attempt to accomodate both co-defendants. 
Notwithstanding the attorney's representations, the Fourt' 
Circuit stated that "despite these appearances, we cannot be per-
suaded that the jealously guarded constitutional right to effect~ 
assistance of counsel has been accorded to Sawyer." 358 F. 2d at 73. 
In reaching this result, the Court in Sawyer construed the ~ 
formulation as follows: 
The salient fact remains that divergent interests 
did exist, and therefore an opportunity was presented 
for the impairment of Sawyer's right to the unfettered 
assistance of counsel. It is not necessary that Sawyer 
delineate the precise manner in which he has been 
harmed by the conflict of interest; the possibility 
of harm is sufficinet to render his conviction invalid. 
358 F.2d at 73. 
In Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir., 1975), 
it was held that merely foreclosing a plausible defense required a 
reversal. In that case four teenage inmates had been charged with 
the murder of a fellow inmate. The petitioner and two of the other 
co-defendants were represented by the same court appointed attorney. 
The fourth co-defendant was represented by a retained attorney. The 
Court held that a conflict of interest did exist where because of 
petitioner's joint representation, he was unable to accuse one of 
the boys as being the sole perpetrator. The Court explained that 
it was not necessary to show that the defense would have been 
successful: 
Rather, if the record shows that a plausible defense 
(one that might have influenced twelve reasonabl7 . d 
jurors) was foreclosed because it might have preJ1:1dic~ 
the other defendants represented by the same appointe 
counsel, the conviction must be overturned. 516 F. 
2d at 1079. 
- 20 - _J 
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In the instant case, appellant's joint representation 
precluded him from accusing the co-defendant and his brother of 
being the two that robbed the Riverbend Lounge (See Appendix A and 
B). However, had the appellant been represented by an attorney whose 
loyalties were unimparied by a conflict of interest, he could have 
cross-examined the co-defendant and both his brothers to show that 
he never entered the Riverbend Lounge on the evening it was robbed. 
fuis version of the facts is not without support in the record. 
Trooper Moon testified that the appellant had only two dollars in 
his pocket when arrested (R. 53) whereas one of the Lopez brothers 
had fifty or sixty dollars in his pocket (R. 53). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel because his attorney's conflict of interest precluded him 
from zealously asserting a plausible defense in his behalf, to-wit: 
the co-defendant and his brother robbed the Riverbend Lounge; the 
appellant did not. Mr. Esplin could not point to Lopez' guilt to 
shield the appellant because he also represented Lopez. The conflict 
was thus real. 
Because the trial court never advised the appellant of 
the dangers of dual representation, and because no waiver of the right 
to conflict-free, separate counsel appears on the record, the burden 
shifts to the State to prove either that no conflict of interest 
existed, or that the conflict did not prejudice the appellant. 
Even if this Court should reject the burden-shifting procedure 
- 21 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adopted by the Foster, Olsen, and Carrigan courts, appellant's 
I 
conviction should still be reversed since he has demonstrated that I 
an actual conflict of interest did exist. Glasser v. United State1 1 
' 
supra, prohibits this Cotrrt from indulging in 
the amount of prejudice resulting from the 
"nice calculations" as r· 
"'I denial of conflict-free, I 
separate counsel. 315 U.S. at 75-76. 
i 
I 
Although the per se rule announced in Holloway v. Arkansa1,' 
supra, was couched in terms of the situation where the attorney bro9\ 
the potential conflict of interest to the attention of the trial cou.-:; 
appellant contends that limiting the holding to that particular set I 
of facts is unwarranted. Certainly it would be unfair to penalize I 
the appellant because his court appointed lawyer failed to warn I 
I 
the trial court that a conflict of interest existed between the co· 
defendants. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the fact 
that few defendants can, realistically, protect their own rights 
or appraise the quality of their representation. ~J~o~h=n~s~o~n~v.:....:....._Z_e_r_bstj 
304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (1938). Scant justification exists for imput9 
responsibility for the attorney's conduct to the defendant. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that any conflict of 
interest case is really a problem of ineffective assistance of counse:~ 
The very fact that appellant's counsel failed to appreciate that a 
conflict of interest existed and thereby neglected to warn the trial i 
court is the heart of appellant's assignment of error. Under the ! 
circumstances, appellant's counsel had no business even acquiescini 
i · 's I 
to the court's request to represent the co-defendant. Mr. Esp in l 
loyalties should have been uncompromisingly committed to the appellt:! 
' f 1 recognize the It would be ironic indeed, if Mr. Esplin s ai ure to 
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conflict of interest - the very error appellant now complains of -
renders his claim somehow unripe, or waived. The fact that neither 
the trial court not appellant's lawyer appreciated the possiblity 
that appellant's constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel was being infringed by dual representation should not 
prejudice appellant's claim. Persuasive on this point is Holland v. 
Boles, 225 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.W. Va., 1963), wherein the Court made 
these apt observations: 
There remains for consideration the effect, if 
any, of the fact that the record here is devoid of 
proof that either the regular judge or the special 
judge was sufficiently aware of the factual situation 
to recognize and appreciate the inevitable conflict 
of interests. The effect upon the accused is the 
same whether or not the court knew Holland was 
impro¥erly represented. He has not been accorded 
the e fective representation by counsel to which he 
is constitutionally entitled. . . Judge Denman, of 
the Ninth Circuit, in the original opinion in 
Ha~an v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, at page 460 ( 1 1) , has this to say: "If, unknown to the court, 
the accused's counsel were bribed by an enemy of 
the accused to throw his case and the accused learned 
of it after conviction, the fact that the court had 
nothing to do with the wrong done, does not deprive 
him of his right to the writ." (Emphasis Supplied) 
For these reasons, appellant respectfully submits that 
the Court below should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
~--. 
· · ' '·r· ;S lJ \./,.v( 
,.\_. ,;._.\.., _...,1 
---' 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
I ROY J . TIPPETTS , Case No. 15512 
I Defendant-Appellant. 
I, ROY J. TIPPETTS, being first duly sworn according to law 
depose and say: 
I action. 
1. That I am the defendant-appellant in the above entitled 
2. That I believe that a conflict of interest with my co-
! defendant prevented me from receiving effective assitance of counsel. 
I 
3. That I know that my attorney, Mr. Michael Esplin, was 
fully cognizant of this conflict. 
4. That I know he was aware of this conflict because of a 
1 conversation I had with him sometime in September, at his office. 
I 
Both Joy Anderson, my sister, who lives in Seattle, Washington, and 
1 
Sandra Gibson, 648 East Ramona Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, were 
' present at this conversation. On that occasion, I specifically told 
: Mr· Esplin that al though I was in the car when we were apprehended by 
i 
j the state Trooper, I was not one of the two who robbed the 
Riverbend Lounge. I told Mr. Esplin that my co-defendant and one 
of his brothers - whom I specifically named - were the ones who 
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5. That I asked the co-defendant's brothers to testify 
in my behalf, but that they both flatly refused. 
6. That I told Mr. Esplin that the Lopez brothers refus; 
to voluntarily appear and testify for me. 
7. That Mr. Esplin indicated he would subpoena the Lope; 
brothers for trial, but he never did. 
DATED this _2 )~day of ::J /-~ 1978. 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of ) 
On the 2) /.1 day of ..2 ->, ) -
' 
1978, personally appeare 
before me ROY J. TIPPETTS, the signer of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
. STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
I ROY J. TIPPETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 15512 
I, SANDRA GIBSON, being first duly sworn according to law 
depose and say: 
1. That I was present when the appellant, ROY J. TIPPETTS, 
I was interviewed sometime in early September by his attorney, Mr. 
Michael Esplin, at the Utah County Legal Defender Association Office, 
107 East 100 South, #29, Provo, Utah 84601. Also present at that 
interview was Joy Anderson, now residing in Seattle, Washington. 
2. That at that interview, the appellant told his attorney 
that he did not rob the Riverbend Lounge; he did specify by name the 
two men who did. 
DATED this _;(_, !] day of f1,q f ' 1978. 
/ 
SARAGIBSON 
f7 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this )l - day of 
' 1978. 
My Commission Expires: 
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